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ARTICLE
Liberty and Community in Marriage:
Expanding on Massey’s Proposal for a Community Property
Option in New Hampshire
JO CARRILLO*
ABSTRACT
This article argues that intimate partners should have the right to adopt
a sharing economy within marriage. Forty-one U.S. states employ a
separate property regime for property acquired during marriage; of these,
only two allow married couples to opt out of the separate property system
and hold their assets as community property. Nine U.S. states are
community property states. To encourage equal partnership in marriage,
Calvin Massey proposed that New Hampshire, a separate property state,
enable a community property option. This essay expands on Massey’s
proposal by comparing it to three other marriage reform proposals: two
based on privatization, and another focused on equitable distribution laws.
To be sure, all four reforms refer to market-metrics, but only the community
property option proposal allows for the qualitative claim that an individual
has a right to enter into and maintain a marriage between economic equals.
Massey’s view was that the state should enable, not frustrate such a right.
For this and other reasons, this essay develops a comparative and analytic
foundation for Massey’s community property option proposal.
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INTRODUCTION
Would legislative enablement of a community property option in a
separate property state such as New Hampshire maximize individual liberty?
Calvin Massey thought so for reasons he outlined in Why New Hampshire
Should Permit Married Couples to Choose Community Property.1 In this
essay I develop a comparative and analytic foundation for Massey’s
community property option proposal.
Some think it contradictory to discuss marriage and individual liberty in
the same breath. But, as it turns out, concerns about individuality are often
the impetus for marriage reform proposals, including general ones that are
critical of marriage as an institution and specific ones to do away with statelicensed marriage altogether. It may seem that marital property reform is of
interest to only a small group of family law scholars, however, the topic
potentially affects anyone who cares about retaining their individuality in the
context of a committed relationship.
Two points before I begin. Each is fundamental to my analytic
framework.
One, Massey did not argue for marriage privatization, and neither do I.
In this essay I propose a legal-philosophical analysis of the concept of
individual liberty within a discrete set of marriage and divorce reform
proposals. I do not intentionally engage critical theory scholarship about
whether marriage is good (or not) for a particular cohort.2 Such inquiries are
illuminating to be sure, but they tend to engage with the structural issues of a
particular historical moment rather than with the deeper ideas underlying the
institution of marriage, which means that the most influential of the “is
marriage good for” analyses are sociological, not philosophical.

1

Calvin Massey, Why New Hampshire Should Permit Married Couples to
Choose Community Property, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 35 (2015).
2
RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? HOW THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011); June Carbone
& Naomi Cahn, Is Marriage for Rich Men?, 13 NEV. L.J. 386 (2013).
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Two, critical analyses explicitly concern themselves with what
philosopher Elizabeth Anderson refers to as “durable hierarchies.”3
Massey’s article does not. Nevertheless, I use Massey’s article as a starting
point for my analysis because of how it calls out individual liberty as a prime
reason to marry. Had Massey continued to explore the legal connection
between marriage, individual liberty, and state action, I believe he would
have developed a full blown equal protection argument, the premise of which
might be that at key property transfer moments in an adult life, federal law
treats married persons in forced separate property states differently than it
treats married persons in community property states.4 Such an equal
protection argument is outside the scope of this essay; nevertheless, it
influences my analysis.
In this essay I compare four marriage reform proposals for how and what
kind of liberty each purports to maximize.
Part I examines two marriage privatization proposals and one enhanced
equitable distribution enforcement proposal. I argue that each of these three
proposals—the proposal to replace marriage with civil union; the proposal to
do away with marriage; and the proposal to enhance equitable distribution
enforcement at divorce—measures individual liberty by a market-metric such
as the one enshrined in classical liberalism. Each proposal (I suspect
unintentionally) also defends an economic morality identifiable by how it
valorizes the needs of the autonomous individual at the cost of obscuring the
needs of the community, in this case (at the very least) the community of the
married couple.5
Marriage reform proposals that promote the individual over a community
are recognizable by a distinct constellation of foundational premises: (a)
resources are scarce; (b) a minimal state maximizes individual liberty; (c) the
market is a necessary if not fair and just way to distribute material goods
even when it comes to intimate partnerships; and (d) the social ideal favors
the self-reliant individual.
3

Nick Pearce, Interview with Elizabeth Anderson, 19 JUNCTURE, no. 3, AugustOctober 2012, at 188–93.
4
Massey, supra note 1, at 36–43 (identifying four instances where there is
disparate treatment between separate property and community property systems: (a)
one spouse dies and the other spouse later sells an appreciating asset that was
acquired by the decedent during marriage; (b) the decedent dies survived by issue;
(c) the spouses want to act as economic equals; (d) the spouses change their domicile
from a community property state to a separate property state. Massey says of
disparity (a), “the disparity in treatment is significant.” Id. at 38.).
5
DONALD E. FREY, AMERICA’S ECONOMIC MORALISTS: A HISTORY OF RIVAL
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (2009) (tracing the history of two rival schools of American
normative ethics back three centuries to their Calvinist (later Puritan) and Quaker
origins—the central tenet of Calvinist school is individual autonomy while the
central tenet of the Quaker school is self in relation to others).
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Each one of the three proposals I discuss in Part I is built upon these
premises. Each regards marriage as a usurpation of individual liberty. And
each regards divorce (or non-marriage) as liberty’s return. The two
privatization proposals do not explicitly discuss property while the enhanced
equitable distribution enforcement proposal exclusively concerns itself with
property division at divorce. All the same, because each proposal
incorporates market-metrics as a measure of successful legal intervention,
each defines liberty in relation to happiness, which in turn implies a state of
being that flows from self-reliance, thrift, and property management.
Consequently, each defines happiness in traditional relation to property rights
in the form of acquisition, appreciation, and ultimately stability if not
wealth—all familiar market-context concerns.
Part II analyzes Massey’s proposal to enable a community property
option in New Hampshire.6 Massey’s proposal discusses property rights not
before or after but during marriage. Massey’s article is concise and
technical. I respond briefly to the technicalities raised. My main interest,
however, is in Massey’s implied theme that an individual has a right to form
an equal economic partnership within marriage.7
One final note, the absence of an explicit engagement with the concept of
gender removes Massey’s article from the critical legal theory tradition, as
pointed out above. Even so, the way in which Massey identifies individual
liberty and community as elements to balance when understanding the state’s
role in marriage falls within a distinctly American Enlightenment lineage that
broadly concerns itself with similar ideas.8
I.

RICHER AND POORER: MARRIAGE AND THE AUTONOMOUS
INDIVIDUAL

In 1859, around the time that the Western U.S. states were adopting their
respective community property systems, John Stuart Mill wrote about the
need for “a real discussion” about gender.9 In the context of marriage (and of
a law school-sponsored symposium) I do not interpret a real discussion to be

6

Massey, supra note 1.
Id.
8
See FREY, supra note 5, at 163–66.
9
John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN
STUART MILL 143 (2002).
7

2017

LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY IN MARRIAGE

293

limited to legal doctrine.10 Rather, I interpret that phrase to mean an analytic
analysis that goes “descending to foundations.”11
To approach those foundations, I start with the link that Mill made
between “marriage” and what he sometimes referred to as “amatory
relationships.”12 In the U.S., for all but a recent post-Obergefell era,
marriage has cohered mainly around one course of action, one that defined
legal marriage as between a “man” and a “woman.”13 I use quotation marks
around each gender label because when understood pre-theoretically, each is
problematic in the extreme.14 Indeed, for Mill, binary gender labels obscure
the relationship between individual liberty and the state for at least one
reason, namely that the category man constructs the category woman through
education and legal marriage.15 One single experience of gender relations is
obviously significant. Nevertheless, all it proves, Mill argued, is that people
have been able to exist under a system in which, by “a fatality of birth,” the
social position of “woman” is marked inferior to the social position of
“man.”16
It could be likewise be argued that one experience of gender inequality is
acceptable so long as there is incremental change over time. After all—that
argument might go—society has attained some “degree of improvement and
prosperity” under one gender system.17 But I would agree with Mill’s twopronged response to such an argument. First, we don’t know the pace of
improvement or the prosperity society might have attained under a genderequal experience, a point that contemporary economists might well agree
with.18 And second, every improvement society has made “has been so
invariably accompanied by a step made in raising the social position of [the

10

See, e.g., JO CARRILLO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY
PROPERTY LAW:
MARRIAGE, PROPERTY, CODE (2016); JO CARRILLO,
UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW (2015); Jo Carrillo,
Financial Interpersonal Violence: When Assets and Transactions Become Weapons,
22 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 17 (2016).
11
Mill, supra note 9, at 143.
12
Id. at 143–44.
13
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612–15 (2015).
14
See generally ANDREW N. SHARPE, TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE:
DYSPHORIC BODIES OF LAW (2002) (discussing legal analyses of gender and human
bodies).
15
Mill, supra note 9, at 142.
16
Id. at 142–43.
17
Id.
18
See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS:
HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS TO
GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009); Stuart White, Left Liberalism: Principles and
Prospects, 18 RENEWAL: J. LAB. POL. 28 (2010) (discussing traditional political
philosophical theories and how they relate to wage labor).
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pre-theoretical category] women” as to be notable. 19 In other words, despite
one experience of gender relations, gender equality has nevertheless become
a contemporary metric for determining a society’s commitment to individual
rights.
What is interesting to consider is that while the U.S. has had only one
experience with marriage as a gendered institution, it has had two empirically
verifiable experiences with marriage as an economic institution. On one
hand, forty-one U.S. states follow a separate property system originally
adopted from England.20 Of these states, only two (Alaska and Tennessee)
enable a community property option for married residents.21 On the other
hand, nine U.S. states follow the community property system, a system
whose cornerstone is a sharing principle that traces back to Nordic
tribespeople by way of the Visigoths.22 In the nine community property
states, married persons consent to the community property system when they
marry, but they also retain the freedom to contract out of that system, in
whole or in part, at any time.
The forty-one separate property states, as I will discuss below, stress the
importance of the autonomous individual even within the noncommercial
relational context of marriage. Not surprisingly, proposals to reform
marriage and divorce tend to react to that stress point by raising questions
such as these. Why marry if one might not leave a marriage with property
rights fully intact because of equitable distribution laws? 23 Or, on the flip
side, why marry if one remains in a sort of losing commercial competition, so
to speak, with one’s working or higher earning spouse?24 These are
important questions for those who stay in the paid labor force as well as for
those who (for whatever reason) remove themselves by choice or find
themselves removed by circumstance.25
But there is a set of questions specific to the spouse who is not gainfully
employed. For example, one might ask where is the human dignity in an
unequal intimate relationship? Does caring for others leave one at the risk of
19

Mill, supra note 9, at 143.
See, e.g., Massey, supra note 1, at 35–36.
21
Id. at 35.
22
Jo Carrillo, Imagination and Fate in the Origin of the Community Property
Sharing Principle (Feb. 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916737 [https://perma.cc/3C4Z-KT6Q].
23
See generally Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and
the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996); Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and
Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997) [hereinafter
Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor].
24
Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, supra note 23, at
118–19 (discussing how judges ignore the economic value of home labor when they
refuse to credit it as a voluntarily made contribution to family wealth).
25
See, e.g., id. at 84–104 (discussing analytic philosophical arguments for and
against the commodification of home labor).
20
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exiting a marriage impoverished? Do spouses assume ethical obligations
toward each other voluntarily, perhaps as a byproduct of romantic love?
Must the state step in to ensure that a richer spouse supports a poorer spouse?
Or, must it otherwise guard against one spouse taking advantage of the other
in any transaction between them? And, if there is no real opportunity to
choose an equal economic partnership for oneself within the institution of
marriage—the sort of liberty Massey’s proposal argues for—what social
good is gained from marriage, especially from the perspective of someone
who values their individual freedom?
Part I, Section A and B discuss three marriage reform proposals. Two of
those—the proposal to replace marriage with civil union and the proposal to
do away with state-licensed marriage—argue for decreased state involvement
in romantic relationships.26 The third proposal to strengthen equitable
distribution enforcement argues for increased state involvement at the end of
marriage as a way to correct historical injustices to wives.27
A.

Proposals to Privatize Marriage

Marriage has many critics; divorce has even more.
This section builds on a popular essay by philosopher Laurie Shrage in
which she analyzes the nexus between marriage reform proposals and larger
agenda for social change.28 Shrage agrees, as do I, with marriage
privatization and deregulation proponents that marriage should not be used
by the state to establish religion, determine parentage, or avoid poverty. At
the same time, Shrage disagrees, as do I, that the state has only a narrow
interest in marriage and the family.29 As the basis for her argument, Shrage
examines replacing marriage with civil union.30
In the next two subsections, I rely on Shrage’s essay to frame the
proposals that I compare with Massey’s community property option.31 I use
Shrage’s philosophical essay to help illuminate questions relevant to how
marriage reformers envision individual liberty. Where Shrage identifies only
one marriage privatization proposal (marriage is replaced by civil union), I
see two distinct proposals (one, marriage is replaced by civil union; and, two,
the state removes itself entirely from licensing marriage and civil union).
Therefore, for reasons set forth in the next Section, I question Shrage’s
26

See, e.g., Laurie Shrage, The End of “Marriage,” in THE STONE READER:
MODERN PHILOSOPHY IN 133 ARGUMENTS 636–41 (Peter Catapano & Simon
Critchley eds., 2016).
27
Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wives after Wendt, 32
CONN. L. REV. 249 (1999).
28
Shrage, supra note 26, at 636–41.
29
Id. at 639.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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empirical claim that replacing marriage with civil union will necessarily
deposit romantic partners into the realm of private contract.
1.

A Proposal to Replace Marriage with Civil Union

In many (if not most) U.S. states, a state-recognized civil union is statelicensed. In some states—California being one—registered domestic
partnership is the equivalent of marriage for all legal purposes.32 Just as
registered domestic partners must obtain a state-issued license to initiate their
legal partnership, so too must they obtain a court-issued judgment to
terminate it.33
Legally speaking the rationale for replacing marriage with civil union is
in large part historical, not empirical. The rationale goes like this: in the
context of a romantic or sexual relationship, the linguistic term civil union is
less laden with ambiguity than is the word marriage.34 One strength of the
civil union idea is that it might encourage the state to expand the institution
to include familial relationships that are not romantic, amatory, or sexual; if
so, it would be possible for civil unions to be created for practical reasons
between parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, collateral
relatives, and so on.35 That said, the civil union proposal I discuss here
specifically calls for replacing marriage with civil union.36
Imagine State X where marriage opponents propose that civil union (or
perhaps something called the registered domestic partnership) replaces
marriage. The ostensible reason behind such a legal transition would be to
prevent the state from regulating an institution that binds unrelated adults in
what, at its core, the proposal assumes to be primarily (if not solely) a moral,
cultural, and religious practice.37 The economic dimensions of the institution
of marriage are downplayed if not altogether ignored in this proposal.38 But

32

CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (2003).
Id.
34
Shrage, supra note 26, at 636–37 (identifying proponents of this approach as
“Cass Sunstein, Richard Thaler, Martha Fineman, Tamara Metz, Lisa Duggan,
Andrew March and Brook Sadler (to name only some of those who have put their
views in writing) . . .”).
35
Id. at 637–38.
36
The proposal was more insistent prior to the United States Supreme Court
decision legalizing same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015); to be clear, however, whether and how the basic civil union proposal might
change in a post-Obergefell legal context is an important question, but it is one
beyond the scope of this essay.
37
Shrage, supra note 26, at 637.
38
Id.
33
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be sure that, if adopted, civilly united persons would still be required to begin
and end their union under the state aegis.39
But what if State X is a state (like California) where pre-transition there
exists no functional difference between marriage and civil union status?40
The proposal to replace marriage with civil union would then leave questions
of divorce, dissolution, and death unaddressed. One could productively ask:
if State X were to repeal marriage-licensing laws and replace them with civil
union registration laws, would the state also need to repeal existing end-ofmarriage laws so as to usher in changes of consequence?41 The answer is yes
for the straightforward reason that if marriage is replaced by civil union but
divorce remains unchanged, then post-transition civil union would (merely)
become marriage by a different name since the same property dissolution
rules that once governed divorce must continue to govern the termination of
civil union.42
Where the goal of abrogating marriage is to preclude State X from using
marriage as a tool to establish morals, culture, or religion, then proponents
may need to think beyond civil union. Because if the point of entry and all
points within marriage are sites where individual liberty is at risk of being
infringed upon by state coercion, then so too is the point of exit. At the very
least, formal divorce laws establish a state preference for serial monogamy;
and equitable distribution laws establish yet another for market-based
solutions to property dissolution at divorce. Moreover, if concepts like
monogamy and the just market presumption are as grounded in religion as
marriage opponents in State X say the institution of marriage is, then
replacing marriage with civil union could address but not overcome the
specter of establishment .
Indeed, so long as State X leaves dissolution, and probate laws
unchanged, the civilly united remain as at risk for being coerced by the state
as married persons once were. The risk remains particularly high if the
civilly united must use the pre-transition divorce laws to regain their single
status. The point is that divorce laws establish what Shrage calls “public
values.”43 Hence, because a civil union, as that term is used in the legal
context, is licensed by the state, replacing marriage with civil union does not

39

Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act, CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5
(2003). For more on DPRRA (2003) and its subsequent amendments, see, e.g.,
CARRILLO, UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW, supra note
10, §15.02.
40
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (2003).
41
Additionally, after Obergefell, an open question remains about whether a
linguistic change in the licensing of romantic relationships would affect marital
dissolution in any practical way, and if so how?
42
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
43
Shrage, supra note 26, at 638–39.
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necessarily mean that the state would no longer be involved in the licensing
of romantic relationships, as Shrage contends.44
Moreover—and this is what I add to Shrage’s civil union analysis—we
must first analyze marriage-exit laws before we can conclude that replacing
marriage with civil union will drop romantic partners into the realm of
private contract. This is because if State X passes the proposal to replace
marriage with civil union, parties will no longer be free to marry, but they
will be free to obtain a state-issued license in the form of a civil union.
Correlatively, parties will not be free to simply walk away from their civil
union, rather they will be required to terminate it through a state process.
Therefore, the state that licenses civil unions also regulates personal status
changes and property rights determinations. Excluding from the analysis
domestic violence prevention statutes that protect without regard to marital
status and parentage statutes that determine rights and obligations
independently of marital status, the type of liberty that the proposal to replace
marriage with civil union envisions is similar, if not equal, to the type of
liberty that I discuss in Section B below in relation to the enhanced equitable
distribution proposal.45
2.

A Proposal to Completely Abrogate Marriage and Civil Union

For private contract to become the default method for formalizing
intimate relationships, all state licensing of intimate relationships must be
abrogated. The rationale for doing away with state-licensed intimate
partnerships is as follows: in accordance with principles of substantive due
process and equal protection, persons should be free to arrange their intimate
partnerships in whatever way suits them.46 Furthermore, the argument goes,
the state licensing of intimate relationships infringes on individual liberty by
how it narrows personal choice regarding relationship entry (and I add,
duration, and exit) to state approved options. Protecting individual liberty,
this argument concludes, requires that the state be prohibited from licensing
intimate relationships altogether.

44

By contract-marriage I mean an agreement to formalize a relationship without
the necessity of a state-license. Contract-marriage is different from the traditional
state-licensed marriage contract. The former is not transmuted into a state-license;
the latter, when filed in a public record, becomes a state issued marriage license that
symbolizes continuing public interest in the licensed union.
45
The Domestic Violence Prevention Act, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6200 et. seq.,
was originally adopted in 1993 as part of the comprehensive California Family Code,
which took effect in 1994; see infra Section I.B.
46
See generally, RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE
(2015); Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not be a Crowd: The Case for a
Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977 (2015).
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Elsewhere, in the context of personal choice, I explain the individual
decision to forgo marriage as a “nonmarriage” option.47 Here, in the context
of analyzing concrete marriage reform proposals, I call that decision
contract-marriage. My rationale for the label change is to underscore the
point that if the proposal to abrogate marriage and civil union were to pass,
intimate parties who seek to enforce promises between themselves (and
between themselves and third parties) would indeed be left to contract law.48
An important aside. My habit is to think of romantic unions as being
between two partners; however, the contract-marriage proposal discussed
below is not necessarily limited to two partners. That said, in this essay I am
not arguing for or against nonmarriage or plural marriage of any kind, or
otherwise trying to speak for any person, community, or communities. Nor
am I arguing for or against what is known as polyamory, a term that
sociologist Christian Klesse explains is “an umbrella term for all ‘ethical
forms of nonmonogamy.’”49 Here, I simply make the descriptive point that
contract marriage is a current legal alternative for persons who are of the
opinion that marriage is an infringement on individual freedom for how it
establishes one state-licensed union at a time, an idea that is itself implicitly
premised on monogamy.
Klesse points out that even though polyamory has received significant
scholarly attention since 1995, it is still an under-researched topic.50 Even
so, contract-marriage comes up in that large body of scholarship. On the
progressive left, it comes up in discussions of polyamory.51 On the religious
right, it comes up in relation to polygyny, meaning the constellation of one
male partner and multiple female partners.52 Irrespective of politics,
contract-marriage is also promoted by those persons who hold individual
autonomy in far higher esteem as a value than relational community. What I
notice after perusing recent legal scholarship is that proponents of plural
marriage are keen to discuss the rights of the individual to engage in one or
more intimate partnerships at the same time, but they are hardly, if at all,
interested in the legal issues surrounding property management during or
47

CARRILLO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LAW, supra note 10, at 253–74.
48
See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
49
Christian Klesse, Poly Economics—Capitalism, Class, and Polyamory, 27
INT’L J. POL. CULT. & SOC’Y 203, 204 (2014), https://goo.gl/EqcV7H
[https://perma.cc/MRX9-DPST].
50
Id. at 204–08 (providing a literature review with citations).
51
Id. at 204 n.1 (discussing Christian polygamists in the U.S. and Canada).
52
See, e.g., Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1185 n.18 (D. Utah 2013),
vacated, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016); see also, John Schwartz, A Utah Law
Prohibiting Polygamy Is Weakened, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/us/a-utah-law-prohibiting-polygamy-isweakened.html?_r=1& [https://perma.cc/BY8M-4Y4X].
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property division at the end of such relationships.53 The nascent vision is one
that orbits marriage without being taken off course by talk of obligation or
dissolution.
Imagine State Y proposes to prohibit the issuance of licenses for intimate
relationships. If the proposal passes there will be no marriage or civil union
(prospectively one assumes); but neither will there be divorce. Gone will be
whatever statutory package of rights and duties once governed entry,
duration, and exit points of marriage. Recall that in State X, the proposal to
replace marriage with civil union is intended to prevent the state from
establishing morals, culture, or religion; in State Y, by comparison, the
proposal to do away with state-licensed intimate partnerships is intended to
serve the purpose of maximizing individual liberty.54 But even a state (State
Y) that no longer regulates marriage or divorce by the issuance of licenses
nevertheless continues to regulate intimate partnership break-ups through the
law of contract enforceability.
So what happens if parties break up and want to disentangle or dissolve
their financial ties? Here I am once again in agreement with Shrage, who
points out that what will happen is that we will find ourselves in a legal
environment of privately negotiated contracts that vary widely in their terms,
the circumstances of their execution, and the likelihood of their
enforceability.55
To reiterate: formal relationship exit is not yet on the plural marriage
agenda. Polyamorous activists, legal scholars explain, represent their
movement as one built on values of honesty, consent, integrity, community,
and what I identify as an acceptance of the left libertarian premise that each
individual exercises full ownership of his/her/their body.56 So, one implicit
(but not very plausible) argument in the contract-marriage proposal is that
there is little utility in analyzing divorce in a subculture that is intentionally
built on high-minded values. I strongly disagree. Despite this idealism, I
recognize utility in (at the very least) hypothesizing that break-ups occur, and

53

See, e.g., Hadar Aviram & Gwendolyn M. Leachman, The Future of
Polyamorous Marriage: Lessons from the Marriage Equality Struggle, 38 HARV. J.
L. & GENDER 269 (2015) (omitting analysis of divorce); Hadar Aviram, Make Love,
Not War: Perceptions of the Marriage Equality Struggle Among Polyamorous
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that some of the break-ups could involve property disputes between two or
more partners.57
Klesse argues that differences of the sort that might initiate break-ups are
a nonissue in the scholarship on polyamory to researchers who prefer identity
politics to structural analyses.58
Class, race, childbearing, childcare
obligations, physical ability differences, human capital disparities,
educational disparities: these are the types of structural issues Klesse says are
overlooked in the scholarship; but are these issues especially divisive in
communities that are more homogenous than not?59 This is an empirical
question. Parentage, it is accurate to say, is dealt with elsewhere in the law,
so the rights of children remain the subject of public interest even in a state
that would abrogate marriage.60 Domestic violence prevention legislation
covers persons regardless of marital status, so persons in need of protection
will continue to be able to access state protection.61 But the standard
marriage and civil union abrogation (slash contract-marriage) argument
otherwise devalues state protection.
To be fair, the poly partner with a trust fund, or a high paying job, or an
income-enhancing education will not need post break-up financial support in
the same way that the poly partner who is paralyzed, or differently educated,
or discriminated against in society or in the workplace might. The poly
partner whose name is on title to a house will have a superior legal claim to
possession of that real estate over the poly partner whose name is not on title.
The poly partner who obtains human capital with the help of one or more of
the other poly partners will exit the relationship with that capital, free of any
legal obligation to give back or otherwise compensate supporting partners.
When it comes to nonmarriage or contract-marriage, then, it becomes evident
that property/poverty questions that arise in that context would benefit from
academic attention to structural issues.62
Contract-marriage proponents, seen from the light of their policy
proposals, criticize the traditional constraints and obligations inherent in the
ideal of legal marriage.63 Many oppose the way in which the traditional
concept of marriage assumes monogamy. Others view the terms of the
57
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traditional marriage contract as badly disclosed. They are not alone,
historically speaking. The marriage contract, wrote Harriet Taylor Mill, John
Stuart Mill’s lifelong partner, is “the only contract ever heard of, of which a
necessary condition in the contracting parties was, that one should be entirely
ignorant of the nature and terms of the contract.”64 I interpret Taylor-Mill’s
point to mean that the provisions people agree to when they marry are
coercive because, or if, there is a lack of disclosure or, more generally,
cultural bias against either party engaging in due diligence about their
prospective spouse.65 Hence, in a state that does away with license-based
marriage or civil union, what remains as the way to formalize a relationship
is private contract, a tool that emboldens the autonomous individual by how
it appears to take the state out of determining what categories of intimate
relationships are (or are not) worthy of legal protection.66
With a private contract parties are free to formalize their relationship
with a written document. Or, they can formalize it by doing nothing other
than conducting their day-to-day lives. 67 Whether there is or is not a written
contract, in other words, does not necessarily mean that the parties are not
bound to keep their promises to each other, legally speaking.68 In order to
disrupt the close nexus between marriage, culture, religion, and economics
on any given contract formality issue (like, for example, the enforceability
requirement of who must sign the contract), the state relies on what Mill
labeled “preappointed evidence” laws.69 Ironically, these parallel laws are
themselves problematic for those who hope to remain unencumbered by the
state in their intimate relationships. For example, persons who identify as
participants in a particular culture—perhaps a religious polygynist?—could
argue that preappointed evidence laws infringe on individual liberty because
they condition contract enforceability on mainstream cultural norms and
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behavior(s). In some U.S. subcultures, for example, elder family members
may negotiate and sign the marriage contract, not the spouses themselves.70
We can dismiss the contracts that private ethnic, religious, or even
political practices produce by labeling them illiberal. In the end, however,
intimate partner contracts shall need to be recognized and enforced by the
state if property rights and obligations are to be publically adjudged. Doing
away with marriage will give private organizations more influence over
individuals, as Shrage warns, but the law of contract enforceability will
return those individuals to some semblance of public values, albeit as
expressed in the realm of contract law. Eventually, as has happened in
California, a collection of nonmarried intimate partner contract enforceability
cases will arise to define what categories of relationship-related expectation
the state will predictably enforce in the event of a break-up.71
How then do parties terminate their contract-marriage? Does one or
more persons just walk away? If not, how must a contract be proved? What
if one of the plural marriage partners has outstanding business with a third
party, how does the plural partnership wind that business up? 72 What about
the parties’ subjectivities; how can parties respectfully be presented and
represented in culture, courts, judicial opinions, and so on?73 And, to pile on
two last issues to this list of example issues: what if the contract provides for
a set period of time, say ten years? Shall individuals remain contractually
bound even if the relationship is over, or worse, dangerous?74 The contractmarriage proposal leaves it to contract law to answer such questions. 75
70
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It may be wise to concede that not all state action impermissibly
infringes on individual liberty. When it comes to marriage, the state
facilitates the business of marriage in small and large ways for three clear
reasons: to assist and protect spouses in the acquisition and management of
property; to give third parties confidence to transact business with married
persons; and to protect the public interest. But while doing away with statelicensed marriage may sound hip, modern, and low-risk, this is only because
proponents so far have relied on popular culture as their guide.76 In doctrinal
actuality, a contract-marriage is a high-risk legal set of agreements (some
written down and some not) that leave legal issues between the parties
undetermined. The risk stems from two sources. Private contracts are
negotiated on a relationship-by-relationship basis, which creates factual
complexity. And, reducing the expectations of nonmarital partners to a
written contract is tricky enough to require the involvement of lawyers since
nonmarital partners must first prove a confidential relationship in fact or else
contract at arm’s length.
Yet popular culture portrays nonmarital
relationships in the same happily-ever-after, free-to-be-you-and-me way that
popular media (still) represent sexuality, romantic intimacy, relational
community, and (more to the point) the financial consequences of break-ups.
Thus, the proposal to do away with the state licensing of marriage and
civil union is at its depth a nonanalytic (sentimental?) hacking trope that
strikes a note something like this: the abrogation of marriage will give rise to
forms of romantic coupling that transcend marriage as we know it. That said,
for all their purported bells and whistles, contract-marriage proposals look
very much, to me at least, like what is (still) called marriage.77 The
marriage-hack has not yet happened, especially since marriage-like (or
marriage-lite) relationships can expect to encounter many of the same legal
issues that state-licensed unions deal with at dissolution.
prospective spouses, which under California law is negotiated at arm’s length, is
enforceable so long as that contract, at execution, is (a) not unconscionable and (b)
voluntarily executed); In re Marriage of Pendelton and Fireman, 5 P.3d 839, 848–49
(Cal. 2000) (holding that a premarital contract that waives post-dissolution spousal
support rights is not per se unenforceable so long as the parties are similarly situated
in terms of education, property, earning potential, and each was represented by
independent counsel when the contract was signed).
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(Oct.
17,
2016),
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If State Y passes the proposal to do away with marriage, nonmarried
partners will not be entitled by virtue of their single status to the protections
that marriage and divorce-specific laws once provided. Breaking-up without
a statutory safety net will be the steep price that the individual pays to retain
legal status as a single person relative to one or more intimate partners.
B.

A Proposal for Strong Enforcement of Equitable Distribution Laws
at Divorce

Unlike marriage privatization ideas, proposals to strengthen the
enforcement of equitable distribution laws at divorce accept the ongoing
usefulness of marriage as an institution. What they argue against is what
Massey called the forced separate property system, a system in which
earnings, purchases, acquisitions, and human capital (without
reimbursement) are assigned to the wage earner during and at the end of
marriage.78
In a 1997 law review article Do Wives Own Half? Winning for Wives
After Wendt (“Do Wives Own Half?”), Joan Williams became a
spokesperson for clearing up “our cultural confusion about ownership within
the family.”79 Do Wives Own Half? framed its argument with an empirical
claim that state courts are more willing to split marital property in half in
modest net-worth divorces than in high net-worth divorces.80 Do Wives Own
Half? cites community property cases throughout, but the article does not
demonstrate a functional awareness of the main distributive difference
between community property and separate property systems. Do wives own
half? Well, it depends, half of what and where? A wife owns a present,
vested, one-half interest of community property in a community property
state; so, yes, wives own half by default in nine U.S. states. However, a wife
owns only what she earns, inherits, creates, generates, or has title to in a
separate property state; so, no, wives do not own one-half by default in fortyone U.S. states.
Philosophers had and have since made the argument that human capital
is a co-created asset.81 Williams did not place her argument in that lineage.
Advocacy was Williams’s goal. To that end, Do Wives Own Half? was a call
78

See infra text accompanying notes 114–124. CAL. FAM. CODE. § 2641 (1994)
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to avoid divorce outcomes like the one in the case of Lorna Wendt, a wife
who was awarded alimony rather than property after a lifetime spent
facilitating her husband’s corporate career.82
Do Wives Own Half? specifically wanted to communicate that equitable
distribution statutes, as applied, continue historic injustices against married
women by how those statutes divest women of property at divorce.83 The
article goes on to propose that family court judges regard all property as
potentially divisible at the end of marriage.84 Presumably all means
everything: assets, rents, issues, proceeds, inheritances, personal injury
awards, appreciation, human capital, and anything else that either party may
own.
Do Wives Own Half? is (currently) excerpted in a casebook used in
undergraduate courses.85 For that reason, I think it necessary to identify and
expand upon the proposal that tends to get credited to Williams alone, but
that fairly could be labeled a general proposal to enhance equitable
distribution enforcement. What I add to the discourse is that this proposal
has an implicit burden shifting aspect that would flip the tables on who gets
vested at the end of an equitable distribution proceeding. Rather than require
that the nonowning spouse prove an asset is concurrently owned—as current
statutes provide86—the Do Wives Own Half? proposal would put the burden
on the owning spouse to prove an asset is solely owned.
In the Millian sense, marriage laws justifiably infringe on individual
liberty if they prevent future harm to one or both parties. A valid marriage
license marks a consensual change in status from single to married, so, in that
sense, marriage infringes on each spouse’s liberty to legally conduct him or
herself as a single person. For the wage-earning spouse in an equitable
distribution state, the liberty to earn, acquire, and dispose of property during
marriage remains strong notwithstanding the fact of marriage. Whereas for a
spouse who labors in the home or facilitates the other spouse’s career without
pay, as Lorna Wendt did for her spouse Gary, marriage is borne as a
weightier infringement. The non-earning spouse has the right to make an
82
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equitable distribution claim, yes; but whether that right will culminate in a
property award remains an open question until the trial court exercises its
discretion in the claimant’s favor in a final judgment.
Community property states do not enable equitable distribution; instead,
they rely on the community property sharing principle. Some separate
property states have adopted uniform laws, such as the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act, with the intent to replicate one or more aspects of the
community property sharing principle; New Hampshire has not.87 Nor has
New Hampshire adopted legislation that quantifies (or commodifies,
depending on your perspective) a housekeeping spouse’s contribution to
acquisitions made during the marriage. Rather what a majority of U.S.
states, including New Hampshire, rely on is the traditional separate property
rule that earnings and accumulations obtained during marriage are the sole
property of the acquiring spouse unless the non-acquiring spouse can prove
otherwise. And just as property acquisition is on an asset-by-asset basis
during marriage, so too is equitable confirmation at the end of marriage.
Finally, because only two separate property states offer a community
property option, thirty-nine U.S. states maintain a forced separate property
system.88
So, how is it that the equitable distribution statute infringes on individual
liberty? From the earning spouse’s perspective the answer is that an
equitable distribution statute frustrates the wage-earning spouse’s expectation
to exit marriage without having to share (wages and what was acquired with
wages during marriage) with the nonearning spouse. Historically, this
infringement has been considered justifiable on two grounds. The first is a
doctrinal ground: equitable distribution does not divest the owning spouse of
property, it merely authorizes a judge to confirm and formally document the
nonowning spouse’s proven equitable (moral) right to a claimed asset.89 The
second is a policy ground: equitable division protects the public from having
to support a non-titled spouse who might otherwise become dependent on
public assistance.90
Despite the nonowning spouse’s statutory right to make a moral claim to
the earning spouse’s property (albeit on an asset-by-asset basis) there runs a
deep laissez-faire theme in an equitable distribution system. It is one that
popular culture obsesses over. To be clear, I do not (at all) support or agree
with the laissez-faire argument. I merely articulate it here so as to highlight
the differences between the four proposals discussed in this paper. The
laissez-faire argument is that spouses make choices during marriage that end
up benefitting them (or not) at divorce. The argument applies the label
87
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virtuous (even if implicitly) to the market-based choices of the wage-earning
spouse and the label idle to the choices of the spouse who is not gainfully
employed. By doing so, equitable (fair) division gets recast as unfair and,
sequentially, alimony gets called into question as coercive. In this point of
view, alimony is not spousal support for a divorce transition; it is rather
(mis)characterized as a direct infringement on the earning ex-spouse’s liberty
to keep one hundred percent of post-divorce earnings. Otherwise, alimony,
like the state enablement of equitable distribution, is justified as a way to
prevent harm to the poorer spouse, to any third parties who transacted with
either spouse for family support, and to the general public.
Alimony is available in separate property states, including New
Hampshire.91 And yet it is inscribed as a dependency issue (“an allowance to
the wife upon termination of the marital relation by divorce”) despite good
faith efforts to update marital law.92 The gendered understanding of alimony
survives statutory amendments, in other words, to live on as a mangled
misunderstanding about alimony as a watered-down proxy for (more)
equitable distribution. Seen this way, alimony is not neutral; nor, as far as
either spouse is concerned, is it beneficial in the abstract. Here, the fear is
that alimony represents a negative uncertainty that can morph into genderbased wealth redistribution, in one direction or the other.
Equitable distribution and alimony brings us back to the main question of
this essay: what kind of liberty is up for discussion in a proposal that
presumes that the market is a morally relevant baseline for determining
distributions of income and wealth at the end of marriage?93 In a forced
separate property state, a spouse who works for wages is entitled by default
to his or her earnings, purchases, asset appreciation, human capital,
investment profits, and so on. The nonearning spouse is too, but only in a
formal sense, since the nonearning spouse’s gains over the course of the
marriage will be considerably less than the earning spouse’s gains. True, the
property rights of the earning spouse are balanced by the nonearning
spouse’s right to claim equitable division, alimony, or both. But when the
equitable division claim fails, the request for alimony reveals that starkest of
legal realities: not all rights are equal. If alimony is requested, the wage91

Id. § 458:19.
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earning spouse will nonetheless exit marriage at divorce with markettransferable property rights and human capital, whereas the nonearning
spouse might exit with a nontransferable (because it is a payment that one exspouse makes to the other over time) alimony award.
Do Wives Own Half? argues in favor of enhancing state protection for
wives like Lorna Wendt who, for Williams, stand at the symbolic head of a
long line of historical injustices men have imposed upon women via
divorce.94 I agree that human capital investments—because they are
typically made for the benefit of the family—either should be reimbursed or
allowed as a basis for property offsets at divorce. However Do Wives Own
Half? goes two steps further. It promotes an implicit burden shift in the
equitable distribution laws, as discussed above. And, by doing so, it
promotes doing away with equitable distribution in favor of what it calls “a
new vision of morality.”95 That new morality, it turns out, is not so new. It
actually has a name; it is called universal marital property.
Universal marital property accepts the market as a fair method for
distributing wealth at divorce.96 What makes the cure (separate property with
strong equitable distribution enforcement) different from the sickness
(separate property with weak equitable distribution enforcement), however,
is that the cure goes way beyond any traditional community property model
known in the U.S. today.
Community property limits property dissolution at divorce or death to
what was acquired during marriage, by either spouse, by labor. A universal
marital property system, by comparison, treats all property, whenever
acquired, as divisible at divorce. That said, a universal marital property
system is not unrealistic. Wisconsin enabled a close variant of such a system
when it adopted the Uniform Marital Property Act in 1984; still, even the
Wisconsin system distinguishes between property acquired before marriage
(called individual property) and property acquired during marriage (called
marital property).97 The proposal in Do Wives Own Half? does not.
Nor is Do Wives Own Half? particularly theoretical on the issue of
gender. For one, it uses the term wife in a pre-theoretical way.98 Perhaps in
the late 1990s the word wife had a determined meaning, but today that
word’s certainty can no longer be projected onto every married person who
identifies as female. The word wife does not signify a biological fact, a fixed
94
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gender assignment, or a social marker. It works, sometimes ironically, as an
economic statement. As such, the word wife could describe the spouse who
obtains no or less value for home labor relative to the husband; likewise, the
word husband could describe the spouse who obtains some or higher value
from wage labor relative to the wife.99 Spouses can change their relative
earning possibilities over time. But even with this clarification, I find myself
at odds with the proposal to strengthen the equitable distribution system by
replacing it with a universal property system.
A feminist rationale for the equitable distribution enforcement proposal
is that it remedies historical harms women experience in marriage and at
divorce.
But in any exercise of judicial discretion, what justifies
categorically benefitting one spouse, no matter their gender, over the other?
How does the Do Wives Own Half? proposal work, for example, if the
female spouse is the high earner and the male spouse the low or nonearner?100
Would a feminist proposal such as the one in Do Wives Own Half?
retreat from its advocacy of equal division in a case where to do so would
vest a biological man with property at the biological female’s expense?101
What about where a female spouse obtains an inheritance during marriage?
Would the feminist proposal retreat from its advocacy of universal marital
property? What happens if the male spouse claims alimony from a female
spouse? Does the proposal continue to prefer property division to a
temporary annuity? And, last but not least, how does the proposal apply in a
post-Obergefell context?
In light of these questions, I am left to wonder what the Do Wives Own
Half? gender-specific proposal is intended to remedy. Does it remedy
historical gender biases, as it claims? Is it intended to remedy injustices that
arise from not treating housework, childcare, and career facilitation as
fungible with market labor, as gets raised if the proposal is restated in
gender-neutral language? The proposal does not raise or answer such
framing questions. Instead, it cautions against community property for how
community property systems use commercial metaphors to describe
marriage. As Do Wives Own Half? explains, “commercial metaphors are
jarring when applied to family life”102 as they “send the message that to
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justify entitlements for wives we must commodify the marital relationship in
ways most people find distasteful.”103
Fortunately there are more than a few scholars from multiple disciplines
who critique the short shrift that home labor gets in market-based talk.104 As
someone acclimated to community property law, the arguments I find
persuasive turn on the idea that market-metrics have expressive significance
that (unfairly) convey a preference for wage labor over home or unpaid
caring labor.105 Moreover, because marital property laws are wrapped up in
market-based rhetoric, these scholars point out that market-talk “habituate[s]
its user to thinking in terms of self-interest as a central principle.”106 Legal
scholars criticize these philosophical arguments as being “conversation
stoppers.”107 I disagree. Philosophers may be focused on more foundational
issues than legal scholars are accustomed to working with, but in my research
on community property law I find that philosophical work encourages, if not
facilitates, inquiry into whether and how U.S. marital property law and its
critics are enthralled with the autonomous individual and the application of
market-based metrics even in the realm of intimate partnerships.
So, what can be done to resist thinking about marriage as something
more than a quantifiable property bargain between autonomous
individuals?108
Marital property laws affect more than just the individuals who marry or
divorce; they set policy for the state. They manage complex dependencies,
as contrasted with what Silbaugh and others have called the “relentless
essentialism” that economic models too often rely on.109 They influence
culture. Thus, to the degree that marital property laws stress the individual
autonomy of spouses to the exclusion of the relational equality between
them, even implicit references to market-metrics operate to establish a state
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preference for an autonomy-based morality if not culture in the
jurisdiction.110
Forced separate property regimes, to be sure, have historically
engendered property. Home laboring spouses are made poorer by the fact of
marriage to a wage-earning spouse. So far, the doctrinal corrective is
alimony.111 But, as discussed above, alimony leaves the poorer spouse with a
nontransferable entitlement that is dynamic (meaning modifiable) and fragile
(meaning terminable) in a way that the transferable property right is not. The
wealth disparity in marriage, when confirmed by the state at divorce, gives
domino effect credence to the worry that relational community in marriage is
a road to financial ruin and coercion.112 Marriage becomes feared as the
institution at the end of which no one comes out ahead.113
What liberty does marriage infringe upon from the perspective of the
spouse who labors at home without pay? To be sure, a forced separate
property state deposits that spouse, whom Do Wives Own Half? characterizes
as having sacrificed a wage-based career to care for others, into an abject and
dehumanizing accounting. Sacrifice implies choice. Choice implies
voluntariness and disclosure. Therefore, it is fair to ask, in the tradition of
Harriet Taylor Mill, whether the home laboring spouse agreed to such a lifealtering choice based on full knowledge. So, too, it is fair to ask whether the
home laboring spouse understood that by opting out of wage labor a
socioeconomic class rift would start and grow in the marriage by operation of
law, and possibly be confirmed by a judge at divorce or death. 114
110

Massey, supra note 1, at 40–41; FREY, supra note 5, at 3–4, 35, 39–40, 44
(discussing autonomy bias, its popularization by JANE MARCET, CONVERSATIONS ON
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1816), an introductory text; and its secularization by FRANCIS
WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1837), a bestselling American
textbook).
111
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:16 (2016).
112
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 95–101 (1996)
(presenting the “domino theory” that market and non-market explanations cannot
coexist because eventually one (the market explanation) will extinguish the other
(the non-market explanation)).
See generally Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, supra
note 23, at 83–84 (taking view that market and non-market explanations can co-exist
in the discourse about wage labor and home labor in marriage. I share Silbaugh’s
view, and I add that the two strands of explanation do co-exist in the California
community property system. At the same time, I find Radin’s domino theory
especially explanatory of the doctrinal tensions at play in the forced separate
property context being discussed in this paper.).
113
See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, Should the theory of Alimony Include Nonfinancial
Losses and Motivations?, 1991 BYU L. REV. 259, 274 (1991).
114
Compare Elizabeth Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS 287
(1999), with Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism? 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5
(2003).

2017

LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY IN MARRIAGE

313

To sum up, separate property/equitable distribution systems ostensibly
put forth a social ideal, namely that a nonearning spouse should be permitted
to bring an equitable (moral) claim to property acquired by the other spouse
during the marriage. Indeed, even though equitable distribution laws soften
the original common law of separate property, they also use a market-based
metric to assess the needs and the virtues of the wage-earning spouse. Many
times the cost of using that metric is that the needs and contributions of the
spouse who works in the home without pay are obscured. Do Wives Own
Half? calls for a different ideal at the same time that it relies on the market as
a symbol of fair property division at divorce. A lot of legal change to circle
back to a status quo point of departure.
II.

RICHER OR POORER TOGETHER: THE AUTONOMOUS INDIVIDUAL IN
COMMUNITY

Massey’s thesis is that a state, such as New Hampshire, would maximize
individual freedom if it were to enable a community property option for
married residents.115 Massey points to Alaska and Tennessee as examples.116
Alaska allows a private community property option to be exercised by a
community property trust or contract.117 Tennessee allows the option to be
recognized (only) by creation of a trust.118 Massey also points to the nine
community property states as sources of reliable doctrinal and policy
information on how community property works: these states collectively
bank hundreds of years of statutory law, case law, commentary, and
scholarship.119
Thus, for Massey, if we add the two U.S. community property option
states (Alaska and Tennessee) to the nine community property states
(Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin (by passage of the Uniform Marital Property
Act)) we have eleven U.S. states that give married residents an option—a
personal choice—to govern their marriage by community property
principles.120 Consequently, if we subtract those eleven states from fifty
states total, we are left with thirty-nine U.S. states in which “married couples
are forced to accept separate property” as the default economic system of
their marriage.121 Massey’s use of the word forced in this context is the
reason I find his proposal a useful entryway into how it is that individual
liberty and marriage can be connected.
115
116
117
118
119
120
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In an actual separate property state, couples have no choice but to govern
their marriage by an autonomy morality.122 (They can perhaps get around
this problem by the use of a trust, a solution that requires its own law review
article). As discussed above, market-based and driven, autonomy morality
creates property inequality in a marriage over time.123 The wage-earning
spouse, by default, becomes richer relative to the spouse who labors at home.
Moreover, as Massey points out, by marrying in or moving to a separate
property state a couple is implicitly coerced into accepting for their marriage
a default asymmetrical economic system.124
Assume State N, a separate property state. In State N, if a married
person buys a house and takes title in his or her name alone, that spouse
owns legal title to the house with exclusive rights to management and
control. The legal right to manage includes the right to convey, certainly the
right to devise, the right to exclude, and perhaps even the right to destroy.125
Each of these management and control rights, if exercised, could and would
allow the title holder, acting alone, to determine shelter issues for the other
spouse and any children.
A couple in State N may opt out of the forced separate property system,
but only on an asset-by-asset basis. Making decisions in such a piecemeal
way takes time; and, as Massey pointed out, it also takes professional legal
knowledge, especially for the couple who migrates to New Hampshire from a
community property state.126 Therefore, from Massey’s point of view, when
State N coerces married residents and new domiciliaries to adopt a default
separate property rule for their marriage, State N simultaneously infringes on
each spouse’s individual liberty “to create an equal economic partnership
without making specific title decisions each time property is acquired.”127
Here, then, is the premise of Massey’s argument: there are individuals
who seek equal romantic partnership. They want to be self-reliant, together.
They want to practice thrift, together. They want marital property laws that
make it easier and less expensive for them to co-create equality in their
marriage over time. Populating Massey’s proposal, refreshingly, are couples
who want the state to enable a default marital property system that will allow
them to choose sharing as the ethic of their marriage, regardless of who earns
the wage. Today we accept that making automatic contributions to a taxdeferred account encourages saving.128 So, why the skepticism over whether
marital property laws can encourage the same? Law can encourage property
122
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equality between married couples; it does in nine U.S. states. As John Stuart
Mill wrote: “having had only one experience of gender does not negate the
possibility of other experiences, it only proves that we live under an
experience we somehow have come to tolerate.”129
But, as I argue above, we have two categorical experiences of marital
property systems in the U.S. With the two experiences in mind, here is my
elaboration of Massey’s community property option proposal. Nine states
promote property equality in marriage with community property.130 Two
states allow spouses to choose default property equality in marriage; they do
this by enabling a community property option. Thirty-nine U.S. states
continue to deprive married individuals, no matter their gender, of the right
to own the acquisitions of their marriage equally by operation of law: there,
spouses are coerced into orienting toward a market-based system that makes
one of them richer than the other over time.
The separate property title rule seems consistent with general property
law, and it is. It measures success or failure by the yardstick of the fair
market presumption. In the context of interpersonal relationships, however,
the title rule materially disadvantages both married persons. The title rule,
says Massey, is particularly disadvantageous to longtime spouses who
demonstrate over the course of their lifetimes that they value and have valued
each other as property equals.131 (The wage earner is disadvantaged by (a)
the inability to choose a default concurrent title rule for acquisitions made
during marriage and (b) the financial uncertainty that separate title creates
under federal tax and state intestacy laws; whereas the non or lower wageearning spouse is disadvantaged by higher income tax on capital gains of the
marriage in the event that she or he outlives the earning spouse). I find this
aspect of Massey’s proposal poignant, especially since it was one of the last
law review articles he published. I break my analysis to speak briefly from
my personal experience as Massey’s colleague of a quarter century. I
recognize in Massey’s proposal the love, respect, and commitment he so
often expressed for his spouse Martha. I also recognize the hope that Massey
expressed for their daughter Ellen.
Massey’s brief article invokes the mountain of academic literature that
highlights and re-highlights the feminization of poverty, as well as the role
that marriage and childcare play in that process. Specifically, it indicates that
“the economic gains of marriage can be disproportionately vested in the high
earning spouse.”132 But while the law review literature on the feminization
129
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of poverty is concerned primarily with the sociology of how economic
options become over or underdetermined during marriage, very little of it
explores whether or how state marital property laws (which can be technical
in the extreme) create or perpetuate such a property/poverty problem.133
Scholarly accounts of marital property laws are too often de-linked from
the issue of property division at divorce.134 Some underscore that “marriage
rarely is a means to economic and social security [for spouses who do not
earn a wage] and often puts these goals at risk.”135 But does such a
declaration implicitly condemn marriage and divorce to one painful
experience in which a spouse must subordinate or else be subordinated by
their counterpart? I do not accept that to marry is to necessarily brace
oneself for a forced-march into a Meow Wolf experience of durable
hierarchies.136 I remain hopeful that we are capable of creating and cocreating fairer experiences of intimate partnering. Just because “the
economic gains of the marriage can be disproportionately vested in the high
earning spouse” does not mean that spouses should be forced into that
outcome by operation of law.137
Massey’s proposal answers the question of how a separate property state
can support those who (a) want to marry (or are married) and (b) want to
strive for property equality in their marriage. It places less stress on the
autonomous individual and more stress on community. It makes room for
the qualitative values of community by arguing that two individuals should
have the right to maximize their liberty by the exercise of a state enabled
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choice “to create an equal economic partnership without making specific title
decisions each time property is acquired.”138
Obviously mapping the sociology of economic (in)security in marriage
would help scholars understand the institution. So too would identifying
how legal proposals intersect with social values like equality and fairness.
Massey’s proposal is helpful in the latter regard. It compares separate
property and community property outcomes for recurring fact patterns. For
example, it explains the ever eye-opening step-up in basis to show how a
surviving spouse in a community property state is not liable for federal
income tax on the appreciation of (community property) assets that were (a)
acquired during the marriage, (b) retained until the decedent spouse’s death,
and (c) sold thereafter; residents in separate property states are.139 It explains
under what circumstances the spousal share election does not guarantee the
“economic fruits” of a marriage to the surviving spouse.140 It urges New
Hampshire to add a quasi-community property rule to any community
property option statute it might adopt.141 It explains how the New Hampshire
legislature, bench, and bar can keep “abreast of current developments” in
community property law.142
Finally, Massey’s article makes its case in ways that are lacking in the
other proposals I’ve analyzed in this essay. First, Massey accurately
contextualizes his proposal in the law.143 Second, he signals an awareness
that the defining legal details of marriage and dissolution are questions of
state law.144 California and New Hampshire have different laws when it
comes to marriage; so do California and Connecticut.145
Doctrinal
differences matter, even to scholars who look down from lofty altitudes,
138
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because such differences affect legal and policy outcomes not only in the
state, but in the marriage itself—that micro-community with which each
proposal is ultimately concerned.
In California (Massey’s former domicile), for instance, the duty to
support a spouse is statutory; therefore contract provisions between spouses
to waive spousal support during marriage are unenforceable due to a dual
state interest to protect the economically weaker spouse relative to the
economically stronger spouse and to protect the public.146 Consequently, an
argument in favor of enforcing contract provisions that waive spousal
support rights and obligations during marriage is not persuasive, at least not
in court. Neither is it adjudged good public policy.
To wrap up, marriage is more than (merely) right or obligation. It is
personal, political, social co-creation. I see the possibility for such an idea in
146
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not mean to suggest that a title document is irrelevant in the California community
property system, only that such a document does not conclusively determine
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Massey’s proposal, especially because it is premised on the idea that
marriage involves qualitative values that are as, if not more, important than
anything quantitatively market-based. It is from this vantage point that
Massey’s article urges the state of New Hampshire to enable a community
property option and to adopt the Uniform Community Property Rights at
Death Act to protect the rights of couples who migrate there from a
community property state.147 These changes to the law are practical ways
that New Hampshire can benefit “industrious, thrifty people who invest their
savings,” together, during marriage.148
CONCLUSION
Massey’s community property enablement proposal does not require
doing away with the institution of marriage. It does not ignore the end point
of marriage. It does not claim the right of marriage but then ignore the
reality of divorce. It does not call for the state to categorically flip the
presumption in equitable division statutes so that the interests of a formerly
benefited class of spouses (the gainfully employed) become subordinated to
those of a formerly disadvantaged class of spouses (the unpaid).
What makes Massey’s proposal worthy of implementation is that it
analyzes market phenomena without measuring individual success by
market-metrics. By reconciling two concepts that are not often even linked
in marriage reform proposals—individual liberty and marriage (relational
community)—Massey’s proposal carves out a meaningful way in which a
state can enable the use of contract and trust to facilitate a choice for property
equality in marriage.
Choosing property equality as a default option envisions the use of
contract. Contract not as a tool to guarantee self-enrichment, but rather as a
way to process, negotiate, and co-create a common discourse based on
consent, dialogue, disclosure, fairness, and voluntariness. In my view these
are qualitative ideals that animate the community property sharing principle;
and they may become the values that inspire the quest for a community
property option in separate property states.
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